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RACE INEQUITY FIFTY YEARS LATER: LANGUAGE RIGHTS UNDER THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose*
INTRODUCTION
The occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 gives pause to consider whether the Act has been effective in
eradicating discrimination against people of color. Much has changed over
the past fifty years. In 1964, it would have been difficult to imagine an
African American president and the end of de jure racial restrictions in
employment, education, voting, jury service, and places of public
accommodation. However, as the old French expression goes: plus ça
change, plus c’est la même chose—the more things change, the more they
stay the same.1
Racial discrimination still exists in 2014, but it manifests itself
differently. In view of this, it is imperative that the civil rights laws of
yesterday are equipped to address the race problems of today. Over the past
half-century, both racial demographics and the manner in which racism is
expressed in the United States have changed. Expressions of racism have
become more subtle and sophisticated.2 Rather than explicitly barring
someone from employment, education, public accommodations, and civic
participation on the basis of his or her race, racially discriminatory exclusion
is often couched in seemingly race-neutral terms.3 Such racially
discriminatory practices often go unremedied because current colorblind
legal jurisprudence is increasingly formalistic and frequently refuses to look
beyond the surface of inequitable acts to reveal the underlying discriminatory
impetus.4
*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. I am grateful
to the University of Pittsburgh School of Law’s Derrick A. Bell Fund for
Excellence Award and its Bell Fellow, Megan Block, for providing research
assistance and support for this project. I am also indebted to Andrea Freeman,
James Gonzales, Benjamin Minegar, and Grace Miclot for their feedback.
1
JEAN-BAPTISTE ALPHONSE KARR, LES GUÊPES (Jan. 1849).
2
Kevin R. Johnson, Driver’s Licenses and Undocumented Immigrants: The Future
of Civil Rights Law?, 5 NEV. L.J. 213, 216 (2004); see, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence
III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 331, 340–41 (1987).
3
Johnson, supra note 2, at 235.
4
Adherents of “colorblindness” define racial discrimination as either on-its-face
racial exclusion or racial classification or recognition of any kind, whether it be for
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Another change is that, while in 1964 African Americans were the
largest racial minority,5 today Latinos constitute the largest racial minority
population in the United States.6 It is often assumed that antidiscrimination
laws protect all racial groups equally. This Article questions that assumption
and explores the competence of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which was
enacted to address racism against African Americans, in addressing racial
discrimination against Latinos by examining the Act’s treatment of language
discrimination. Racial discrimination is often expressed differently against
Latinos than it is against African Americans. Most notably, language
discrimination, which includes discrimination on the basis of actual or
perceived English-language ability, bilingualism, and accent, is a common
method of subordinating Latinos.7 For Latinos, language discrimination is not
simply a linguistic issue; it is frequently a form of discrimination on the basis
of race and national origin. Language discrimination is challenging to address
in the courts because English-language requirements are often viewed as
race-neutral, even when they serve to exclude or subordinate Latinos and
other racial minorities.8
This Article focuses on language discrimination in the areas that the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was primarily concerned with: employment,
education, public accommodations, and civic participation—concentrating,
in the latter respect, on jury participation. The Civil Rights Act, particularly
Titles VI and VII, has been the primary federal law used to challenge
the purposes of race-based exclusion or affirmative action. Colorblind
jurisprudence imposes a literal “anti-differentiation principle” whereby
“discrimination is defined so narrowly that it is virtually impossible to advance a
constitutionally [or statutorily] cognizable claim of racial discrimination . . . .”
Cedric Merlin Powell, Schools, Rhetorical Neutrality, and the Failure of the
Colorblind Equal Protection Clause, 10 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 362, 378
(2008).
5
Carlo A. Pedrioli, Respecting Language as Part of Ethnicity: Title VII and
Language Discrimination at Work, 27 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 97,
102 n.42 (2011).
6
Jorge M. Chavez et al., Sufren Los Niños: Exploring the Impact of Unauthorized
Immigration Status on Children’s Well-Being, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 638, 638 (2012).
7
See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, Buscando América: Why Integration and Equal
Protection Fail to Protect Latinos, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1432–34 (2004)
[hereinafter Buscando América].
8
See Laura M. Goodall, Comment, The “Otherized” Latino: Edward Said’s
Orientalism Theory and Reforming Suspect Class Analysis, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
835, 847 (2014) (quoting Andrew P. Averbach, Language Classifications and the
Equal Clause Protection Clause: When Is Language a Pretext for Race or
Ethnicity?, 74 B.U. L. REV. 481, 499 (1994)).
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language discrimination in the United States. Regulations promulgated and
cases decided under Title VI and VII have been ahead of constitutional
jurisprudence in recognizing that language discrimination is a form of
national origin and, at times, race discrimination.9 However, the Act has
ultimately proved ineffectual in redressing language inequity for several
reasons.
This Article examines the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s treatment of
language discrimination and suggests ways that the Act can better protect
against such discrimination. Part I explores the differences and similarities
between race discrimination in 1964 and today and looks at language
discrimination as an example of contemporary race discrimination against
Latinos. Part II examines language discrimination in the areas of
employment; education; public accommodations; and the courts, particularly
jury service; as well as the availability of protection against such
discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It evaluates both the Act’s
deficiencies and its untapped potential in combating language discrimination.
Part III examines structural problems with the Act that have limited its
effectiveness in eradicating language discrimination.
I. RACE & LANGUAGE DISCRIMINATION: YESTERDAY & TODAY
In evaluating race inequity fifty years after the enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, it is important to consider the changing face of racial
discrimination and racial demographics in the United States. In 1964, the
largest racial minority group was African Americans.10 Jim Crow laws
overtly discriminated against African Americans, relegating them to separate
public schools and public facilities and denying opportunities to participate
in democratic self-government activities, such as voting and jury service.11
In 2014, Latinos are the largest racial minority. 12 Racial discrimination
persists today but is less conspicuous. Rather than hanging signs that say “No
Negros” or “No Mexicans,” racial exclusions are doled out in “race-neutral”
code. One example of these racially discriminatory but purportedly raceneutral exclusions is English-language requirements. Under current
9

See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodríguez, Accommodating Linguistic Difference: Toward
a Comprehensive Theory of Language Rights in the United States, 36 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 133, 190 (2001).
10
Pedrioli, supra note 5, at 102 n.42.
11
See Delgado & Jean Stefancic, The Racial Double Helix: Watson, Crick, and
Brown v. Board of Education (Our No-Bell Prize Award Speech), 47 HOW. L.J.
473, 483 (2004); Barbara Y. Welke, Beyond Plessy: Space, Status, and Race in the
Era of Jim Crow, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 267, 273 (2000).
12
Pedrioli, supra note 5, at 102 n.42.
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“colorblind” jurisprudence, a sign outside a restaurant stating “No Mexicans
or Dogs Allowed” (as was prevalent in the Southwest in the 1950s and
1960s)13 would be unlawful and condemned by the majority of Americans.
However, a sign stating “English only,” even when the common
understanding is that in practice it means “No Spanish” and hence “No
Latinos,” may survive legal scrutiny and even be celebrated by many
Americans as patriotic.14 Similarly, prospective jurors could not overtly be
excluded from service on the basis of their race,15 but language ability (either
limited English proficiency or full bilingual ability) can serve as a basis
whereby Latino citizens and other minorities can be excluded.16
Language-based restrictions have long been a tool used to subordinate
Latinos.17 In the Jim Crow era, African Americans were segregated in schools
throughout the South and other regions of the United States on the basis of
their race.18 Latinos were also subjected to race-based educational
segregation, but this segregation was veiled under the pretext of language.
For instance, in the Southwest, Mexican American children were segregated
in separate “Mexican” schools or “Mexican” classrooms within white schools
on the purported basis of their deficient English-language skills.19 However,
these students’ English-language abilities and consequent assignment to a
Mexican school or classroom were frequently determined not on the basis of
linguistic skill, but rather simply on their Mexican appearance or Spanish
13

See REYNALDO ANAYA VALENCIA ET AL., MEXICAN AMERICANS AND THE LAW
8 (Adela de la Torre ed., 2004); Antonia Castañeda, Language and Other Lethal
Weapons: Cultural Politics and the Rites of Children as Translators of Culture, 19
CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 229, 234 (1998); see generally CYNTHIA E. OROZCO,
NO MEXICANS, WOMEN OR DOGS ALLOWED: THE RISE OF THE MEXICAN
AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2009).
14
See Pedrioli, supra note 5, at 102 n.42; Rodríguez, supra note 9, at 220–21.
15
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879), abrogated by Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
16
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
17
Buscando América, supra note 7, at 1432–34.
18
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19
See Mendez v. Westminster Sch. Dist., 64 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1946), aff’d,
161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947); Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Salvatierra, 33 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1930); Robert R. Álvarez, Jr., The Lemon Grove Incident: The Nation’s
First Successful Desegregation Court Case, 32 J. SAN DIEGO HIST. 116, 116
(1986), available at http://sandiegohistory.org/journal/86spring/lemongrove.htm
(citing Petition for Writ of Mandate, Álvarez v. Lemon Grove Sch. Dist. (No.
66625) (1931)); see also Lupe S. Salinas, Linguaphobia, Language Rights, and the
Right of Privacy, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 53, 63–65 (2007) [hereinafter
Linguaphobia].
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surname.20 The segregated Mexican schools or Mexican classrooms offered
substandard facilities and instruction,21 and sometimes even lacked any
teachers at all.22
Today, English-language requirements, although race-neutral on their
face, are often prompted by racial animus against Latinos. English-only laws
are habitually brought about in response to popular movements driven by a
“mission[] of ‘race betterment,’” “questions about the intelligence and values
of Latin American immigrants,” and a “fear of a Hispanic takeover.”23
However, despite racist, nativist, and xenophobic beginnings, legislative
history and statutory language do not mention Latinos or the Spanish
language. This is not surprising; overtly acknowledging the primary targets
of the bill would be legally and politically objectionable. Nonetheless, there
is frequently a common understanding that, in both original intent and
application, “English-only” rules and statutes are often intended to be “NoSpanish” restrictions.24 These rules are generally less about a genuine
preference for English than a means to limit Spanish usage, exclude Spanish
speakers, and make Latinos of all linguistic backgrounds feel unwelcome.25
Language discrimination affects Latinos of diverse socioeconomic,
citizenship, immigration, and language backgrounds. Latinos may be
20

Mendez, 64 F. Supp. at 550.
Meaghan Field, Voting Equality and Educational Equality: Is The Former
Possible Without the Latter and Are Bilingual Ballots a Sensible Response to
Education Discrimination?, 17 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 385, 389
n.21 (2011).
22
My grandfather, Rafael L. Gonzales, reports that in Southern Colorado, in some
instances, white students were placed in Mexican classrooms, but only as a serious
form of punishment. Interview with Rafael L. Gonzales, La Junta, Co. (July 14,
2014).
23
Philip C. Aka & Lucinda M. Deason, Culturally Competent Public Services and
English-Only Laws, 53 HOW. L.J. 53, 85 n.207 (2009) (citing Thomas Ricento’s
research “based on examination of the internal documents, funding sources and
written statements of leaders of the English-Only movement”); see generally Juan
F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural
Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 356–57 (1992) [hereinafter
Demography and Distrust]; Lupe S. Salinas, Immigration and Language Rights:
The Evolution of Private Racist Attitudes into American Public Law and Policy, 7
NEV. L.J. 895 (2007) [hereinafter Immigration and Language Rights].
24
Braden Beard, Note, No Mere “Matter of Choice”: The Harm of Accent
Preferences and English-Only Rules, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1495, 1506–07 (2013)
(citing Alfredo Mirandé, “En la Tierra del Ciego, El Tuerto es Rey” (“In the Land
of the Blind, the One Eyed Person is King”): Bilingualism as a Disability, 26 N.M.
L. REV. 75, 103 (1996)).
25
Aka & Deason, supra note 23, at 85–86.
21
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discriminated against on the basis of being Limited English Proficient (LEP),
fully Spanish-English bilingual, or having a Spanish/Hispanic accent.
Further, due to the problem of perceived foreignness (viewing Latinos as
foreign irrespective of the duration of their American ancestry or
nationality),26 Latinos are often discriminated against when they are
mistakenly perceived as LEP or bilingual or as having an accent even when
they do not. For example, I come from a Chicano New Mexican family that
never crossed any border. Rather, the border crossed my family when New
Mexico became part of the United States pursuant to the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo in 1848. I am a native English speaker who grew up in Oregon in an
English-speaking household and learned Spanish primarily through classes
and work abroad. However, throughout my life people have frequently
assumed I am LEP or speak English with a Spanish accent. For instance, in
third grade I was placed in special education classes for a nonexistent
“accent.” As an adult, in several professional settings, colleagues have
described me as a person with a “heavy Spanish accent,” though I speak
English with an Oregon/Pacific Northwest accent that is a rather standard
American accent unassociated with Hispanic background. This phenomenon
of misperceiving an accent or English-language limitation based solely upon
a Latina’s physical appearance, surname, or ancestry indicates the close
relationship between race and language for Latinos. Not only is language
often central to one’s internal Latino identity,27 it is also a key external racial
identifier used by others to classify a person as Latino.28
As the argument that language discrimination can be a form of race
discrimination is an unfamiliar concept to many, it might be helpful to pause
and consider the meaning of race and racism, and the intersection of race,
26

See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 11, at 490; Richard Delgado, Derrick
Bell’s Toolkit–Fit to Dismantle That Famous House?, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 283, 302
(2000).
27
Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the García Cousins Lost Their Accents:
Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules
as the Product of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85
CAL. L. REV. 1347, 1364 (1997); Rodríguez, supra note 9, at 141 (noting that
language “defines the essence of cultural identity”); see Hernandez v. New York,
500 U.S. 352, 364, 370 (1991) (Even Justices of the United States Supreme Court
have acknowledged that, for many Latinos, Spanish language is used to “define the
self,” and “[l]anguage permits an individual to express both a personal identity and
membership in a community”); J.A. Fishman, Language and Ethnicity, in
LANGUAGE, ETHNICITY AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 15, 25 (Howard Giles ed.,
1977).
28
See Yxta Maya Murray, The Latino-American Crisis of Citizenship, 31 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 503, 548 (1998).
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racism, and the Spanish language for Latinos. In our society, racial groups
are defined by certain physical or cultural characteristics.29 This differs from
national origin (the country of one’s or one’s ancestor’s origination) because
diverse populations are lumped together in broad classifications such as
white, black, Asian, or Latino instead of recognizing the diversity of national
origin and other backgrounds of the individuals and their ancestors. 30 Racial
prejudice is the attribution of negative qualities to these identifying
characteristics.31 Racism is racial prejudice plus power.32 We often see this
with skin color, hair texture, and phenotype.33 For instance, people with dark
skin, kinky or curly hair, and certain facial characteristics may be racially
classified as “black” without regard to their unique ancestry. Racism
materializes when negative qualities are associated with physical (or cultural)
traits. An example of this distinction would be when someone sees a person
with the aforementioned physical characteristics and classifies them as
“black” and then, without any basis, perceives them to be dangerous,
intimidating, dishonest, or criminally inclined. The first assumption is one
about race; the second is racism.
For Latinos, in addition to physical characteristics, Spanish language
or accent are attributes used to designate the individuals as a racialized
collective group of Latinos, Hispanics, or “Mexicans” despite their
multiplicity of ancestry and other background traits.34 Racism steps into play
when the use of Spanish is perceived to hold innately negative qualities, such
as being “dirty,” un-American, abusive, foul, threatening, uneducated, or
offensive. These racist perceptions about the negative qualities of Spanish are
then used as a justification for imposing English-only rules. Racism is also
present when Spanish language or accent is used as a racial proxy to exclude
or subject the speaker to less favorable treatment. Throughout this Article,
we will see examples of how Spanish language is used as a proxy for race
and how Spanish is perceived to possess inherently negative qualities that
are, in turn, employed to justify English-only policies.
Language discrimination affects many Americans. LEP35 persons are
29

Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Language Disenfranchisement in Juries: A Call for
Constitutional Remediation, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 811, 835 (2014).
30
Id. at 828.
31
Id. at 835–40.
32
Beverly Daniels Tatum, Defining Racism: “Can We Talk?,” RACE, CLASS, AND
GENDER IN THE UNITED STATES: AN INTEGRATED STUDY 127 (Paula S. Rothenberg
ed., 6th ed. 2001).
33
Gonzales Rose, supra note 29, at 835–40.
34
Id. at 826.
35
In this essay, a LEP individual is defined as one who “[does] not speak English
as their primary language and [has] a limited ability to read, speak, write, or
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the group most frequently and severely affected by language discrimination.
LEP individuals comprise a significant percentage of the population and are
predominately people of color, particularly Latinos.36 Nearly ten percent of
the population in the United States is LEP.37 That is approximately 29.5
million people.38 There is a tremendous correlation between race and
English-speaking ability in the United States. The vast majority, 87 percent,
of LEP individuals are people of color.39 That is about 25.67 million people
of color, of which an estimated 21 million are Latino. 40 Despite popular
perceptions to the contrary, many LEP individuals are United States citizens.
A conservative estimate is that 13 million United States citizens are LEP.41
English-language requirements and preferences exclude and
subordinate LEP people, particularly Spanish-speaking Latinos, in a variety
of contexts, including employment, education, domestic relations, access to
healthcare and public services, and participation in democracy. For example,
private employers have increasingly imposed “English-only” rules in
workplaces, which have been applied to humiliate, discipline, and fire
workers, as well as exclude LEP customers, especially Latinos. 42 In public
understand English . . . .” Limited English Proficiency (LEP), LEP.GOV,
http://www.lep.gov/faqs/faqs.html (last visited June 9, 2015).
36
MIGRATION POLICY INST., DATA BRIEF: LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENT
INDIVIDUALS IN THE UNITED STATES: NUMBER, SHARE, GROWTH, AND
LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY 6 (Dec. 6, 2011), available at
http://migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/LEPdatabrief.pdf (“Most
LEP individuals speak Spanish. Spanish-speaking LEP individuals accounted for
66 percent of the total US LEP population in 2010.”).
37
Id. at 1.
38
Id.
39
PEW HISPANIC CTR., TABLE 20: LANGUAGE SPOKEN AT HOME & ENGLISHSPEAKING ABILITY, BY AGE, RACE AND ETHNICITY: 2009 (2011), available at
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2011/02/17/statistical-portrait-of-hispanics-in-theunited-states-2009/2009-statistical-portrait-23/.
40
Gonzales Rose, supra note 29, at 814.
41
Id.
42
See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1980). Garcia, a bilingual
employee, was fired for speaking Spanish in an English-only workplace. The Fifth
Circuit upheld the “English-only” rule, finding it did not impose hardship upon
Garcia because he was bilingual and capable of speaking English. Id. See also
Pedrioli, supra note 5, at 97; Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating
“National Origin” Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805,
826–27 (1994) [hereinafter Ethnicity and Prejudice] (discussing how courts of
appeal fail to recognize language restrictions in the workplace as a form of national
origin discrimination).
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schools, students’ violations of English-only rules have resulted in Latino
students being sent to “Spanish detention” or suspended simply for speaking
Spanish on school grounds.43 Some courts have even found speaking Spanish
at home to be a form of child abuse and have threatened to remove custody
from Latino parents unless they speak English to their children.44
Furthermore, LEP individuals face significant barriers when it comes to
accessing healthcare and public services.45 Even the ability to exercise the
fundamental right to vote can be inhibited when accommodations are not
provided to LEP citizens.46 Further, LEP citizens are routinely excluded from
jury service in most jurisdictions.47
LEP individuals are not the only people subject to language
discrimination. Bilingual persons, particularly bilingual Latinos, are also
affected. A recent study revealed that 38 percent of Latinos in the United
States are “Spanish dominant, 38 percent are bilingual and 24 percent are
English dominant.”48 This is not merely an immigrant issue. Nearly half of
United States-born Latinos are not English dominant.49 Widespread LEP
language-based exclusions, coupled with accent and bilingualism
discrimination, affect a large number of Latinos and other people of color in
the United States but are often left out of discussions about race
discrimination. In pondering whether the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been
effective in curtailing race discrimination, it is important that the topic of
language discrimination finds a place in the discussion.
II. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 & LANGUAGE DISCRIMINATION
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, most notably Titles VI and VII, is the
primary source of law utilized to challenge English-only policies and other

43

Buscando América, supra note 7, at 1443; Mirandé, supra note 24, at 103.
Buscando América, supra note 7, at 1445.
45
Siddharth Khanijou, Note, Rebalancing Healthcare Inequities: Language
Service Reimbursement May Ensure Meaningful Access to Care for LEP Patients,
9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 855, 857 (2005).
46
Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, ¡Su Voto Es Su Voz! Incorporating Voters of Limited
English Proficiency into American Democracy, 48 B.C. L. REV. 251 (2007).
47
Gonzales Rose, supra note 29, at 815.
48
PEW HISPANIC CENTER, WHEN LABELS DON’T FIT: HISPANICS AND THEIR
VIEWS OF IDENTITY 4 (2012) available at
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2012/04/PHC-Hispanic-Identity.pdf.
49
Id.
44
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forms of language discrimination.50 Another section of the Act, Title II,51
which addresses discrimination in places of public accommodation, has not
been used to tackle language discrimination, but it could be.52 The Act was
primarily concerned with addressing racial restrictions in employment,
education, places of public accommodation, and full participation in
democracy; thus, in evaluating the Act’s efficacy in combating language
discrimination, it is appropriate to focus on these areas. 53 In recent years,
there appears to have been an upsurge in language discrimination in
workplaces, public schools, and restaurants.54 This section discusses the
current state of language discrimination jurisprudence under the Act and how
the Act can be better utilized to promote language equality.
A. Language Discrimination in Employment
The majority of language discrimination litigation has arisen in the
employment context. Language discrimination in the workplace can occur in
a variety of ways, such as denying employment or promotion based upon
English-language ability, non-English usage, or accent.55 Policies that are
frequently challenged are English-only workplace rules.56 These rules
prohibit workers from speaking languages other than English on the job and
have become increasingly common in the past few decades.57 Challenges to
employee-firings as a result of a violation of English-only workplace rules
are most often evaluated under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.58
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex, and national origin.59 Prohibiting employees from speaking non-English
languages at work has been found to constitute national origin discrimination
50

See James Leonard, Bilingualism and Equality: Title VII Claims for Language
Discrimination in the Workplace, 38 MICH. J.L. REFORM 57, 70 (2004); see
generally Rodríguez, supra note 9.
51
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012).
52
Id.
53
Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 88-352 (1964).
54
See, e.g., Beard, supra note 24, at 1501, 1503–05; Michael DiChiara, Note, A
Modern Day Myth: The Necessity of English as the Official Language, 17 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 101, 129–30 (1997).
55
Beard, supra note 24, at 1496, 1503–05.
56
Mirandé, supra note 24, at 76.
57
Cristina M. Rodríguez, Language Diversity in the Workplace, 100 NW. U. L.
REV. 1689, 1689 (2006).
58
Deborah F. Buckman, Requirement That Employees Speak English in Workplace
as Violative of Federal Constitutional and Statutory Law, 24 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 587.
59
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
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in violation of Title VII.60
The term “national origin” is not defined in the Act.61 However,
national origin has been defined by the United States Supreme Court as
“refer[ing] to the country where a person was born or, more broadly, the
country from which his or her ancestors came.”62 For Title VII purposes, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has delineated
national origin discrimination as including “the denial of equal employment
opportunity because of an individual’s, or his or her ancestor’s place of
origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic
characteristics of a national origin group.”63 The EEOC has also declared that
an “essential national origin characteristic” is the “primary language of an
individual.”64 These guidelines are forward-thinking and recognize the reality
that one’s native language is a part of his or her national origin and that
discrimination on the basis of language or background can amount to national
origin discrimination under the Act.
The EEOC presumes that rules requiring employees to speak English
at all times in the workplace, including breaks, violate Title VII because such
rules amount to burdensome terms and conditions of employment and can
foster a hostile work environment.65
The primary language of an individual is often an essential
national origin characteristic. Prohibiting employees at all
times, in the workplace, from speaking their primary language
or the language they speak most comfortably, disadvantages
an individual’s employment opportunities on the basis of
national origin. It may also create an atmosphere of inferiority,
isolation[,] and intimidation based on national origin which
could result in a discriminatory working environment.66
When English-only rules are only applied at certain times, the rules
60

See, e.g., EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (N.D.
Tex. 2000); Saucedo v. Bros. Well Serv., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
However, while it is well-settled that English-only workplace rules may potentially
violate Title VII, in the majority of Title VII cases challenging such rules the
courts have found that the rules were justified by business necessity and do not
violate Title VII. See Buckman, supra note 58.
61
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (noting the lack of a definition for “natural origin”).
62
Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973).
63
29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1980).
64
Id. § 1606.7.
65
Id. § 1606.7(a).
66
Id.
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must be justified by business necessity.67 Recognized business necessities
include safety, where all communications in a common language of English
enable employees to understand the dangerous task at hand,68 and serving
monolingual English-speaking customers.69 The EEOC acknowledges that
“[i]t is common for individuals whose primary language is not English to
inadvertently change from speaking English to speaking their primary
language.”70 As such, employers who believe they have a business necessity
justifying an English-only rule must provide notice to the employees
outlining the “general circumstances when speaking only in English is
required and of the consequences of violating the rule.”71 Failure to provide
such notice is considered evidence of discrimination on the basis of national
origin.72 However, it should be noted that the courts have not uniformly
followed the EEOC guidelines.73
A distinction has been made in the courts between employees who are
fully bilingual and those who are LEP. The courts’ treatment of bilingual
employees is troubling. Many courts have found that employees who are fully
bilingual in English and another language should be able to comply with the
employer’s language policy and thus are less able to attack it because they
can choose to speak only English.74 This emphasis on language “choice” is
problematic for at least two key reasons. First, bilingual people often
involuntarily speak their native language, so it is not always an actual choice.
Second, emphasis on the bilingual employee’s choice of language obfuscates
the employer’s discrimination.
As noted above in the EEOC regulations, bilingual people often
inadvertently speak in their native language. “[A]dhering to an English-only
requirement is not simply a matter of preference for Hispanics, or other
persons who are bilingual speakers, but . . . such restraints can be virtually
impossible in many cases[,]” particularly when speaking with members of

67

Id. § 1606.7(b).
Montes v. Vail Clinic, Inc., 497 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2007).
69
Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980).
70
29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(c) (1980).
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
See. e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the
notion that an across-the-board English-only workplace rule presumptively
establishes a prima facie case of disparate impact based on national origin
discrimination).
74
Gonzalez v. Salvation Army, 985 F.2d 578 (11th Cir. 1993); Jurado v. ElevenFifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987); Gloor, 618 F.2d 264.
68
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their own cultural group.75 Many Title VII language discrimination cases
arise after Latino employees were fired for briefly speaking to a fellow Latino
Spanish-speaking coworker.76 For instance, in the case of Garcia v. Gloor,
Gloor Lumber Supply had an English-only rule prohibiting employees from
speaking Spanish at work unless they were communicating with Spanishspeaking customers or on break.77 Gloor Lumber Supply is located in
Brownsville, Texas, and a majority of both their employees and customers
are Spanish-speaking Latinos. Hector Garcia, a bilingual Mexican American
salesperson, was fired when another Mexican American employee asked him
a question concerning a product requested by a customer and Garcia
responded in Spanish that the item was not available.78
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that this
enforcement of the employer’s “speak-only-English” rule did not amount to
national origin discrimination or otherwise violate Title VII because Mr.
Garcia was bilingual and thus chose to speak Spanish on that occasion.79 Like
many bilingual employees, Mr. Garcia did not actively choose to violate a
workplace rule. His Spanish response to a fellow Latino coworker’s question
was not an act of insubordination or even conscious choice at that moment;
it was simply an involuntary slip of the tongue. The fact that bilingual
speakers often inadvertently revert back to their native language when
speaking with persons from their cultural group demonstrates how Englishlanguage requirements can be an unfair burden in employment, and also how
deeply-rooted native language is in a person’s communication and identity.
Focusing on bilingual speakers’ “choice” of language obscures the
racism and xenophobia behind English-only rules. In the Gloor case, Mr.
Garcia’s Spanish reply to a Latino coworker did not harm the employer’s
business in any way. However, the employer’s English-only policy and
termination for violation of this policy was a significant harm to Mr. Garcia.
As the EEOC has explained, one’s native language is core to one’s national
origin.80 Penalizing an employee for—or preventing an employee from—
expressing this essential element of his or her national origin when there is
75

EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1070 (N.D. Tex
2000) (discussing the testimony of expert witness, Dr. Susan Berk-Selingson).
76
See, e.g., Saucedo v. Bros. Well Servs., Inc. 464 F. Supp. 919, 922 (S.D. Tex.
1979) (Mexican American discharged for saying two words in Spanish about
where to place an item to his coworker); Gloor, 618 F.2d at 266 (Mexican
American discharged for responding to a coworker’s question in Spanish about
whether an item requested by a customer was available).
77
618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980).
78
Id. at 266.
79
Id. at 271.
80
29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1980).
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no genuine business necessity is inherently discriminatory. It is a direct attack
on the employee’s national origin as well as race.
The discriminatory nature of English-only rules is striking when
compared with discrimination on the basis of religion, which is also a
protected characteristic under Title VII. Absent undue hardship on the
employer, it would be unlawful for an employer to discharge a Sikh man who
refused to remove his turban or a Catholic woman who refused to remove her
crucifix necklace at work.81 Technically, a Sikh could choose to remove his
turban and a Catholic could choose to remove her crucifix. However, the law
recognizes that conditioning employment and its terms and conditions on
such activity is discriminatory in itself.82 Although the employee theoretically
could choose to forgo key aspects of expressing his or her religion, the
employer’s unnecessary requests would result in dignitary harm, and
acquiescence would carry a heavy cost for the employee. Arbitrary Englishlanguage requirements are similar. Even if bilingual employees could abstain
from speaking their native language, requiring them to do so absent business
necessity amounts to a tremendous dignitary harm, as well as an attack on
their national origin and possibly their racial background. However, the
courts have too often treated English-language requirements as akin to
general grooming and dress-code requirements without recognizing the
connection between native language and national origin, ethnicity, and race.83
Prohibiting a bilingual employee from speaking her native language
is demanding her to give up a key attribute of her protected national origin,
and often racial, identity.84 Firing an employee for speaking his native or
cultural language, absent actual business necessity, is discrimination against
that employee’s national origin (and frequently race) even if the employee
81

See EEOC, Religious Garb and Grooming in the Workplace: Rights and
Responsibilities, EEOC.GOV,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/qa_religious_garb_grooming.cfm (last
visited June 9, 2015); but see Dawinder S. Sidhu, Out of Sight, Out of Legal
Recourse: Interpreting and Revising Title VII to Prohibit Workplace Segregation
Based on Religion, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 103 (2012) (discussing
how discriminatory employers have devised ways to get around Title VII’s
provisions).
82
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
83
Mirandé, supra note 24, at 76; Roman Amaguin, Garcia v. Spun Steak
Company: Has the Judicial Door Been Shut on English-Only Plaintiffs?, 16 U.
HAW. L. REV. 351, 363 n.104 (1994) (noting how the Garcia court compared the
employer’s “English-only policy to grooming codes or length of hair”).
84
See Ruiz Cameron, supra note 27, at 1366 (“To suppress the speaking of
Spanish is to suppress an essential, if not the essential, component of Latino
identity.”).
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technically could choose to speak English. Like religion, language is, at least
to some extent, a mutable characteristic. However, the fact that a protected
trait can be changed should not determine whether legal protection is
warranted. Rather, legal scrutiny should focus on the necessity of the
employer’s requirement that an employee change a protected characteristic,
not on whether the protected characteristic could be changed.
Scholars have frequently written about English-only workplace rules
and their impact on employees. An important yet largely overlooked point is
the impact of English-only workplace policies on consumers. In addition to
employees’ interests, the effect of workplace rules on customers and the
broader public should be considered. English-only workplace rules vary.85
Some allow (and even encourage) Spanish-speaking employees to serve
customers in Spanish,86 while others prohibit bilingual employees from
speaking Spanish to consumers even if it is the customers’ primary or
preferred language.87 In fact, customer service jobs are the types of jobs most
likely to have English-only workplace policies.88 Thus, many consumers are
affected by English-only rules.
The impact of English-only workplace rules on consumers is
important for many reasons. First, English-only workplace rules can restrict
the availability of goods and services to minorities. Second, examining the
effect of such rules on customers reveals the discriminatory animus behind
such rules. English-only rules are frequently instituted in restaurants and
hotels.89 When English-only rules are introduced and enforced in these and
other places of public accommodation, Title II may also be implicated.
Accordingly, in evaluating the impact of English-only workplace policies on
consumers, it is appropriate to examine Title II’s potential to protect
consumers who are subject to language discrimination. Like English-only
requirements in schools (discussed below), English-only demands in

85

See Kelley Holland, When English Is the Rule at Work, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/jobs/27mgmt.html?_r=0.
86
See, e.g., Long v. First Union Corp. of Va., 894 F. Supp. 933, 933 (E.D. Va.
1995) (upholding a policy that forbade employees from speaking Spanish except
where a Spanish speaking customer required assistance); Garcia, 618 F.2d at 266.
87
See, e.g., Holland, supra note 85.
88
Rodríguez, supra note 57, at 1690.
89
See, e.g., id. at 1736–37 (discussing the EEOC settlement with Melrose Hotel);
Complaint, EEOC v. Melrose Hotel Co., No. 04 CV 7514 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23,
2004); EEOC v. Melrose Hotel Co., No. 04 CV 7514 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 23, 2004)
(consent decree prohibiting the defendant from enforcing its English-only policy);
EEOC v. Brown Derby Rest., No. 92-2940, at 3–4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 1992)
(consent decree prohibiting the defendant from enforcing its English-only policy).
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restaurants have seen a revival in recent decades.90
B. Language Discrimination in Public Accommodations
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides, “All persons shall
be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or
segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.”91
Establishments that qualify as places of public accommodation within the
meaning of Title II include hotels, restaurants, lunch counters, gas stations,
and places of public entertainment such as theatres, concert halls, and sports
stadiums.92
Title II was prompted by the refusal of private business owners to
serve African Americans in the South and the protests against this
discrimination. Pushing for equal access to public accommodations and
responding to demonstrations at lunch counters in the South, President John
F. Kennedy gave a speech to Congress in support of the Civil Rights Act,
stating, “Surely, in 1963, [one hundred] years after Emancipation, it should
not be necessary for any American citizen to demonstrate in the streets for
the opportunity to stop at a hotel, or to eat at a lunch counter in the very
department store in which he is shopping, or to enter a motion picture house,
on the same terms as any other customer.”93 The legislative history of Title
II reveals that the fundamental object of Title II was to vindicate “the
deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal
access to public establishments.”94
90

See Steven W. Bender, Silencing Cultures and Culturing Silence: A
Comparative Experience of Centrifugal Forces in the Ethnic Studies Curriculum,
33 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 329, 330 n.25 (2000) (citing Steven W. Bender, Direct
Democracy and Distrust: The Relationship between Language Law Rhetoric and
the Language Vigilantism Experience, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 145, 170–72
(1997) (discussing civil rights litigation seeking redress from enforcement of
English-only policies by restaurants and taverns against Spanish-speaking
patrons)); DiChiara, supra note 54, at 130 (“[W]hen Florida’s English-only bill
was enacted, shopkeepers and restaurant owners denied services to non-Englishspeaking patrons simply because of their language.”) (citing Robert Robison,
English-Only Policy Would Hinder, Not Help, Assimilation, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Nov. 16, 1995, at 15A)).
91
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012).
92
Id. § 2000a(b).
93
S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 8–9 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2362.
94
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964).
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During the age of Jim Crow, in the Southwest, racial discrimination
in and exclusion from places of public accommodation were common for
Mexican Americans. Restaurant owners hung signs outside their
establishments proclaiming “[N]o Mexicans or dogs allowed.”95 Mexican
Americans were excluded from restaurants, could only sit in racially
segregated balcony seats in movie theaters, and were only allowed to swim
in public pools on “Mexican Day”—the day before the pool was drained and
cleaned and made suitable for white patrons.96 In recent years, there seems to
be a resurgence of excluding racial minorities, particularly Latinos, from
places of public accommodation.97 However, in these colorblind times, signs
proclaim “English only” instead of “No Mexicans.” The term “English only”
has become racialized code. Despite the different wording, the result and
underlying aim is basically the same: Latinos are refused entry on the basis
of their race and national origin or, at a minimum, are made to feel
unwelcome. Even if Latino patrons can speak English and will be served,
they are being asked to abandon or distance themselves from a core attribute
of their cultural, national origin, and racial groups. Even when this does not
amount to an actual inconvenience, it can still be an indignity.
Examining English-only requirements in places of public
accommodation demonstrates how such rules are not race-neutral. Englishonly rules do not merely have a disparate impact on Latinos and other racial
and national origin minorities; rather, there is also often discriminatory intent
behind these rules. Modern racism has abandoned the racial epithets of old
and now uses racial and racist code words.98 One example is the English-only
ordering policy at Philadelphia’s famous cheesesteak restaurant, Geno’s
Steaks. In 2006, the owner placed a sign stating, “This is America: When
Ordering Speak English.”99 The owner of the establishment stated that he
95

Castañeda, supra note 13, at 234.
STEVEN W. BENDER, GREASERS AND GRINGOS: LATINOS, LAW, AND THE
AMERICAN IMAGINATION 144–45 (2003); Ariela J. Gross, “The Caucasian
Cloak”: Mexican Americans and the Politics of Whiteness in the TwentiethCentury Southwest, 95 GEO. L.J. 337, 382 (2007).
97
Keith Aoki et al., (In)visible Cities: Three Local Government Models and
Immigration Regulation, 10 OR. REV. INT’L L. 453, 521 (2008) (“Recently,
activists sought prohibitions on the use of non-English languages for restaurant
patrons and urged private employers to impose English-only rules on their
employees.”).
98
See generally IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED
RACIAL APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM & WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS
(2014).
99
Michelle García, Wit Cheese, Not Con Queso, WASH. POST, June 18, 2006, at
A2.
96
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posted the sign in response to the debate on immigration reform and the
number of people in the area who are unable to order in English.100 This
statement is revealing because, when he made it, the historically Italian
community where this restaurant is located had seen an increase of
immigrants from Latin America.101 Additionally, “immigration” and
“immigrant” are racially coded words synonymous with Latinos. 102 The
owner also placed a sign stating, “I am Mad as Hell! I want My Country
Back!”103 The idea that white Americans want “their country back” is
commonly a response to the presence of Latinos, both native born and
immigrant.104
However, current colorblind formalistic jurisprudence ignores these
indicators of racial animus. Despite the racist and xenophobic motivation
behind Geno’s Steaks’ English-only sign, the Philadelphia Commission on
Human Relations found the sign was not discriminatory because it “did not
convey a message that service would be refused to non-English speakers.”105
In response, the restaurant owner thanked the Commissioner for “making him
a hero.”106 Although the owner has since died, the sign remains posted to
honor his “dying wish” that it be preserved.107
Similarly, in 2011, the Reedy Creek Family Diner in Greensboro,

Philadelphia’s Geno’s Steaks Adopts English-Only Ordering Policy, FOX NEWS
(June 8, 2006), available at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2006/06/08/philadelphia-geno-steaks-adoptsenglish-only-ordering-policy/.
101
Id.
102
Leila Higgins, Immigration and the Vulnerable Worker: We Built this Country
on Cheap Labor, 3 AM. U. LAB. & EMP. L.F. 522, 526 (2013); Mary Romero, Are
Your Papers in Order?: Racial Profiling, Vigilantes, and “America’s Toughest
Sheriff,” 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 337, 350 (2011); see generally LÓPEZ, supra
note 98.
103
Geno’s Joey Vento Dead at 71, PHILLYMAG.COM (Aug. 24, 2011, 1:18 A.M.)
http://www.phillymag.com/foobooz/2011/08/24/genos-joey-vento-dead-at-71/.
104
DeWayne Wickham, In Ethnic Pandering, Obama Can’t Top Reagan, USA
TODAY, June 19, 2012, at 7A.
105
Andrew Maykuth, Ruling: “Speak English” Sign at Cheesesteak Shop Not
Discriminatory, PHILLY.COM (Mar. 20, 2008), http://articles.philly.com/2008-0320/news/24989499_1_english-sign-geno-s-steaks-philadelphia-commission.
106
Id.
107
Victor Fiorillo, Joey Vento’s Dying Wish: Keep “Speak English” Sign at
Geno’s, PHILLYMAG.COM (Aug. 30, 2013, 12:07 PM), http://www.phillymag.com/
foobooz/2013/08/30/joey-ventos-dying-wish-keep-the-speak-english-sign-atgenos/.
100
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North Carolina displayed a sign stating: “No Speak English. No Service.”108
Another line of the sign read, “We only speak and understand American.”109
The owner says he placed the sign in response to “several Latino customers
that came in and weren’t able to speak or read English.”110 He reported it was
frustrating for him and the customers, and although he did not know enough
Spanish to assist them with their order, he did know enough to understand he
was being cursed at and put down.111 After placing the sign outside his
business, he reported that he received an outpouring of positive feedback.112
He stated that he received supportive telephone calls from people in every
state and eight foreign countries, was interviewed by politically conservative
talk show hosts Rush Limbaugh and Glenn Beck, and, perhaps most
importantly, tripled his business.113 The signs were so popular that he claims
he printed 1,700 copies and gave away all but one.114
Pro English, a group who advocates for “Official English” and
English-only reform, contacted the owner of Reedy Creek Family Diner
offering to represent him in any legal proceedings that might result from the
English-only policy.115 Although legal action challenging such language
requirements has not been brought, Title II could be an effective tool to
address this type of language discrimination. Title II allows private actions
for injunctive relief,116 and prevailing parties are generally entitled attorney
fees.117
1. The Negative Impact of English-Only Rules on Consumers
Whether the English-only requirements directly target patrons or
indirectly affect customers when employees are prohibited from speaking
David Bodenheimer, ‘English Only’ Sign Back Up to Stay at Diner, Owner
Says, THE DISPATCH, http://www.the-dispatch.com/article/20110519/NEWS/30
5199978 (last modified, May 19, 2011, 2:30 P.M.); see also Fox News Insider,
“English Only” Sign Triples Diner’s Business, YOUTUBE (May 23, 2011)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OPB-7XesVrg.
109
Bodenheimer, supra note 108, at 1.
110
Fox News Insider, supra note 108.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 204(a), 206, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(a), 2000a-5
(2012).
117
Reasonable attorney’s fees are available to prevailing Title II plaintiffs under §
204(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, within the discretion of the court. 42
U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (2012).
108
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non-English languages to customers, they negatively impact consumers and
reveal the discriminatory animus behind such requirements. English-only
requirements serve to exclude national origin and racial minorities, especially
Latinos. This discriminatory exclusion produces both tangible and intangible
injuries. Tangibly, these minorities are deprived of goods and services
available to others. They also suffer intangible injuries, such as the dignitary
harm that results when a business chooses to prohibit—or at least strongly
discourage—people from their cultural, national origin, and racial group from
being served by the establishment. These types of deprivations are matters
about which the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is centrally concerned.
The effects of English-only workplace rules—restricting the
availability of goods and services and denying dignity to employees and
customers who speak other languages—reveal the discriminatory animus
underlying them. English-only rules “appear most often in the consumer
services sector[.]”118 Most EEOC complaints deal with the prohibition of
Spanish language, and many of the workplaces at issue in these cases are
located in areas with a significant Spanish-speaking Latino community.119
Rules prohibiting employees from speaking Spanish in consumer services
result in decreased services for Spanish-speaking Latino customers.120
Although Latino employees are directly constrained by English-only rules, in
many circumstances it may be the customers who are also indirectly targeted.
As mentioned above, in some instances, Latino employees are prohibited
from speaking Spanish with Spanish-speaking customers, even when those
customers are monolingual.121 Moreover, as discussed above, some
businesses may limit their customer pool even further by requiring that
customers speak only English in order to receive service.
There seem to be two primary reasons a business would choose to
limit its customer pool by excluding national origin and racial minorities, and
both indicate discriminatory impetus. The business either wants to profit from
discrimination by appealing to intolerant customers, or it prefers
discrimination over making a profit. The first is a reason business owners
frequently expressed after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
when establishments that excluded African Americans claimed that serving
black people was economically detrimental to their businesses.122 This “while
118

Rodríguez, supra note 57, at 1690.
Id. at 1700.
120
See DiChiara, supra note 54, at 125 (explaining how “English-only” rules lead
to miscommunication by preventing non-native English speakers from
communicating with the United States government).
121
See, e.g., Holland, supra note 85.
122
See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (rejecting a restaurant’s
119
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I don’t mind black people, my customers do” attitude is itself discriminatory
because the business owner is supporting and propagating societal prejudice.
Conformity to discriminatory customer preference is not a legally permissible
basis upon which to discriminate against employees or customers.123
If excluding minorities is not lucrative, then discriminatory intent may
be indicated by the business’s failure to act rationally. Ambitious businesses
would likely seek Spanish-speaking employees to cater to a Spanish-speaking
clientele to be locally competitive, or utilize bilingual signs, or at a minimum
simply refrain from taking steps to actively discourage speakers of languages
other than English from spending money at their establishment. A rational
business person would be eager to have employees who speak Spanish or try
to otherwise accommodate LEP customers to maximize profits, especially if
it came at no additional investment. Conversely, discriminatory businesses
intentionally seek to limit their service to this group of customers.
Discriminatory intent should be inferred from the failure to act like a rational
economic actor.
C. Title VI: Public Programs Receiving Federal Funding
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its corresponding
regulations provide protection against language discrimination and require in
many instances that LEP individuals be provided language interpretation in
order to meaningfully participate in public programs and activities. Title VI
provides that, “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.”124 Despite the lack of specific textual
reference or mention of language in its legislative history, similar to the
interpretation of Title VII, language discrimination has been recognized as a
form of national origin and race discrimination under Title VI.125 The most

argument that it would lose a substantial amount of business if it were required to
serve African Americans); Williams v. Connell, 9 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1427 (D.C.
Fla. 1964) (arguing that African Americans could not be served in the restaurant
because that would be detrimental to its business).
123
See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276–77 (9th Cir. 1981)
(holding that an employer cannot refuse to hire women solely on customer
preference to conduct business with men); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,
442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971); Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292
(N.D. Tex. 1981).
124
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
125
Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
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famous instance is the United States Supreme Court case Lau v. Nichols.126
In Lau, LEP children of Chinese ancestry claimed that San Francisco public
schools failed to provide them with English as a Second Language (ESL)
instruction in violation of Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.127 The Court found that the failure to provide ESL
instruction to these students prevented their access to a meaningful
education.128 The Court concluded that the Chinese-speaking LEP students
had been denied a federally funded educational benefit on the basis of their
national origin or race in violation of Title VI.129 Having decided the case on
statutory grounds, the Court declined to reach the Equal Protection claim.130
On August 11, 2000, President William J. Clinton issued Executive
Order 13166, “Improving Access to Services for Persons with Limited
English Proficiency.”131 Executive Order 13166 requires federal agencies to
examine the services they provide, identify the need for these services to LEP
persons, and develop an approach so that LEP persons have meaningful
access to these services.132 The Order also requires that federal agencies make
efforts to ensure that recipients of federal financial assistance also provide
meaningful access to their services.133 Specifically, federal agencies are
required to: (1) develop a plan that provides LEP individuals meaningful
access to the agency’s programs and/or services; (2) issue agency-specific
guidance to bring the agency’s programs/recipients of federal funds into
compliance with Title VI, if the agency has not already done so; and (3)
ensure that LEP individuals have input throughout the process. 134 Both Title
VI protection against language discrimination and the requirement that
language interpretation be provided to LEP individuals have been applied to
ensure access to the courts.
1. Language Discrimination in the Courts: Access & Jury Service
In response to Executive Order 13166, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) issued its own LEP Guidance regulations.135 The DOJ’s LEP
126
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regulations were designed to direct funding recipients “to ensure that the
programs and activities they normally provide in English are accessible to
LEP persons and thus do not discriminate on the basis of national origin in
violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”136 Executive Order
13166 and the DOJ’s LEP Guidance have been applied in the court context
and confirm that most courts are required to provide language services to LEP
persons who participate in the courts.137
Relying in part on Lau v. Nichols,138 the DOJ’s LEP Guidance
reiterates that “failure to ensure that LEP persons can effectively participate
in or benefit from Federally assisted programs and activities may violate the
[national origin] prohibition under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 . . . and the Title VI regulations against national origin
discrimination.”139 Recipients of federal funding must consider four factors
when determining what language assistance is necessary to provide
meaningful access to its programs:
(1) The number or proportion of LEP persons eligible to be
served or likely to be encountered by the program or grantee;
(2) the frequency with which LEP individuals come in contact
with the program; (3) the nature and importance of the
program, activity, or service provided by the program to
people’s lives; and (4) the resources available to the
grantee/recipient and costs.140
After weighing these factors, recipients of federal funding must
determine the extent of language assistance they should provide. However,
the LEP Guidance specifies that this flexibility “does not diminish, and
should not be used to minimize” the agency’s obligations under Title VI.141
Thus, if certain programs are “more important . . . and/or have greater impact
on or contact with LEP persons,” more language assistance will be
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required.142
Applied to the courts, this four-factor test requires, among other
things, that recipient courts ensure that LEP litigants and witnesses receive
language assistance.143
At a minimum, every effort should be taken to ensure
competent interpretation for LEP individuals during all
hearings, trials, and motions during which the LEP individual
must and/or may be present. When a recipient court appoints
an attorney to represent an LEP defendant, the court should
ensure that either the attorney is proficient in the LEP person's
language or that a competent interpreter is provided during
consultations between the attorney and the LEP person.144
The DOJ LEP regulations mention how some courts have adopted
certification procedures for court interpreters and instruct courts to consider
carefully the qualifications of court interpreters who are not certified.145
These regulations also specify that informal interpreters, such as family
members, are inappropriate.146
The issue of providing language accommodation to enhance court
participation among LEP beneficiaries and participants has focused primarily
on litigants.147 But the exclusion of LEP citizens from jury service, and the
attendant denial of juror language accommodation (interpretation for jurors),
is also an underexplored language-rights issue with significant racial and
national origin implications. Elsewhere, I have argued that English-language
juror requirements and the failure to provide juror language accommodation
violates the Fair Cross-Section requirement of the Sixth Amendment and
raises serious Equal Protection concerns.148 Here, I explore how the failure to
allow LEP jurors to serve with juror language accommodation may violate
Title VI.
Many people simply assume that LEP individuals are not competent
to serve on a jury because of their lack of English-language skills. However,
142
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this ignores the possibility of allowing a juror to serve with the assistance of
language interpreters. Juror language accommodation is not a new idea. It has
an extensive, centuries-old history in the United States and Anglo-American
legal systems.149 Further, juror language accommodation has long been
employed in the state courts of New Mexico150 and is currently provided in
most courts for hard of hearing, deaf, and blind jurors.151
All federal courts152 and most state courts153 require English-language
proficiency as a prerequisite to serve on juries. Although the focus of Title
VI analysis has been on litigants, jurors are also participants within the
meaning of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As such, the exclusion
of LEP jurors on the basis of their English-language ability could run afoul
of Title VI. If otherwise eligible, LEP citizens could be made competent to
serve on juries with language accommodation. Thus, in communities with
significant numbers of LEP citizens, denying LEP citizens juror language
accommodation could amount to unlawful discrimination on the basis of
national origin or race under Title VI.
While no notable Title VI litigation has occurred on the issue, it seems
clear that jurors should be considered participants in court programs pursuant
to Title VI. Under similarly worded statutes like the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 (RHA) and Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), jurors have

149

Hiroshi Fukari & Darryl Davies, Affirmative Action in Jury Selection: Racially
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the English or Spanish languages . . . .”); State v. Samora, 307 P.3d 328, 330–31
(N.M. 2013) (holding that the district court’s excusal of a LEP Spanish-speaking
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been deemed “participants” in court proceedings.154 When initially looking
to draft a piece of civil rights legislation for persons with disabilities,
Congress turned to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act to craft § 504 of the RHA,
the precursor to the ADA.155 While Title VI provides that no person shall on
the basis “of race, color or national origin, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,”156 the RHA with
the same wording provides that no qualified individual with a disability shall
“be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.”157
In cases interpreting this RHA provision, once it is decided that jury
service is a federally funded program, it is then accepted that persons with
disabilities serving as jurors must not be denied that participation. For
example, in Galloway v. Superior Court, the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia interpreted the RHA’s language to conclude that it
was “readily apparent” that the jury system fell within the purview of the
statute such that Mr. Galloway, a blind man who previously had been
dismissed categorically due to his blindness, must be allowed participation
so long as he was “otherwise qualified.”158 Similarly, although not as
explicitly, in People v. Caldwell, the Criminal Court in the City of New York
concluded that because summarily dismissing persons with disabilities from
the jury selection process violated the ADA, jury service must be a “program”
contemplated under the statute in which persons with disabilities were
entitled to participate.159 This presupposes that jurors are participants in the
court program.
When a program participant is excluded from a federally funded
program on the basis of being LEP, the DOJ has set forth four factors that
should be considered to determine whether language assistance is required.
The first two factors are the “number or proportion of LEP persons eligible
to be served or likely to be encountered by the program or grantee” and “the
frequency with which LEP individuals come in contact with the
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program[.]”160 In many areas of the country, there are significant numbers of
LEP persons, especially Spanish-speaking Latinos. Nationally, Englishlanguage requirements result in the juror disenfranchisement of almost 13
million United States citizens.161 Some communities, particularly those in
urban areas or located near the southern border, have notably high
populations of LEP residents.162 These populations tend to be geographically
concentrated. Half of LEP persons reside in three states: New York, Texas,
and California.163 In California and Texas there are several cities where LEP
persons comprise over a quarter of the population. For instance, in Texas, 56
percent of Laredo’s residents are LEP, in El Paso it is 33 percent, and in
McAllen it is 32 percent.164 In California, 31 percent of the residents of
Salinas are LEP, 29 percent in El Centro, and 25 percent in greater Los
Angeles.165 There are many other jurisdictions throughout the United States,
including Puerto Rico, where LEP citizens make up a significant portion of
the community.166 As different regions have varying concentrations of LEP
persons, the need for juror language accommodation must be evaluated
specifically in each court’s jurisdiction. Since the majority of LEP persons
are Spanish-speaking,167 Spanish-language interpretation services are
particularly needed.
The third factor presented by the DOJ to determine whether language
interpretation should be provided is “the nature and importance of the
program, activity, or service provided by the program” to people’s lives.168
Serving on a jury is an important responsibility of citizenship. When a person
is excluded from this central function of democracy on the basis of their
English-language ability, they are lumped together with the other groups of
persons ineligible to serve: former felons, “infants,”169 non-citizens, and
160
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those deemed to have poor moral character.170 This results in tremendous
dignitary harm as well as second-class status for LEP citizens.
English-language juror requirements also negatively impact criminal
defendants. An estimated 11.3 million of the United States citizens precluded
from jury service on the basis of English-language ability are people of
color.171 In certain communities, English-language requirements can result in
jury pools that are not racially representative of the community.172 Juries that
are not representative of the community can have serious consequences for
criminal defendants, who are often disproportionately people of color.173
These criminal defendants may be denied a “jury of their peers” or their
fundamental Sixth Amendment right to a jury selected from a “fair crosssection of the community.”174 The purposes of having juries selected from a
fair cross-section of the community are to:
(1) “guard against the exercise of arbitrary power” ensuring
that the “commonsense judgment of the community” will act
as “a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor,”
(2) preserving “public confidence in the fairness of the
criminal justice system,” and (3) implementing our belief that
“sharing in the administration of justice is a phase of civic
responsibility.”175
Looking to this last purpose of having a representative jury pool, it is
important to emphasize that when juries are not representative of the
community, this can undercut the actual and perceived legitimacy and
fairness of the courts and legal system.176 The majority of Americans believe
that jury decisions reached by racially diverse juries are fairer than decisions
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reached by non-diverse juries.177 This belief is well-founded, as studies have
revealed that racially homogenous white juries generally do not spend as
much time deliberating, are less likely to consider diverse perspectives, and
are more likely to commit errors or exhibit racism than racially diverse
juries.178 By contrast, racially diverse juries lessen racist manifestations,
consider more varied perspectives, deliberate more thoroughly, and
ultimately commit fewer errors.179
The fourth and final factor in determining whether language
assistance is warranted is the resources available to the federal funding
recipient (here the courts) and costs.180 The main resistance to providing
interpretation to litigants and jurors are concerns about cost and accuracy.181
These two concerns are closely related. Accuracy of interpretation can only
be guaranteed if the interpreters are highly trained and certified. However,
certified interpreters are in limited supply and require considerable financial
investment.182 It is significant, however, that the limited supply of certified
interpreters is itself a result of language discrimination. The majority of LEP
persons are Spanish speakers.183 Thus, Spanish-language interpreters are in
the greatest demand. If bilingual education was embraced rather than “NoSpanish” and English-only policies in schools, there would be a larger pool
of educated bilingual English-Spanish Americans, as well as speakers of
other languages, who could train to become certified court interpreters. Any
challenges to securing certified court interpreters should be scrutinized with
the understanding that the shortage or cost obstacles (since presumably costs
would be lower if there were a larger supply) have actually been brought
about by discriminatory language policies.
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Concerns about the accuracy and possible intrusive effect of juror
language accommodation are valid but not insurmountable. There is a need
to have qualified and certified interpreters such as the ones employed in the
New Mexico state courts,184 and there is much that can be learned from the
New Mexico interpretation system. Studies of LEP jurors in New Mexico
state courts conducted by Lysette Chavez and Markus Kemmelmeir of the
University of Nevada-Reno Department of Social Psychology have shown
that not only is juror language accommodation possible, it is actually
preferable.185 Archival research and mock jury studies demonstrate that LEP
jurors and interpreters do not compromise deliberation outcomes.186 Further,
additional studies have shown that jurors who served alongside LEP jurors
receiving juror accommodation actually viewed future jury service more
positively than those jurors who had not served with a LEP juror.187
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was centrally concerned about race and
national origin discrimination in key functions of democratic involvement.188
The Act took a bold stance against discrimination that excluded people on the
basis of their race and relegated them to second-class citizenship. Judicial and
administrative agency interpretation of Title VI has taken a realist approach
to recognizing that language discrimination can be a form of national origin
or race discrimination. In the last quarter century, efforts have been made to
increase interpretation services for LEP litigants in the courts, and it has been
recognized that the failure to do so could amount to a Title VI violation.189
However, Title VI has not been sufficiently utilized to challenge juror
language exclusion. English-language juror requirements are generally
viewed as race and national origin neutral. But these requirements are not
race and national origin neutral because they do not take into account how
juror language accommodation can make Latino and other minority LEP
citizens eligible to serve.
This is not the only manner in which these language requirements are
viewed in isolation. Too often policy makers and jurists do not look at the
systemic nature of juror language discrimination. Excluding citizens from
jury service on the basis of LEP removes people of color from the jury pool
See generally Edward L. Chávez, New Mexico’s Success with Non-English
Speaking Jurors, 1 J. CT. INNOVATION 303 (2008).
185
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and can result in unrepresentative juries. The perceived shortage of court
interpreters is a result, at least in part, of English-only school policies and a
lack of bilingual education. Further, the notion that a LEP person could fully
participate on a jury if they learned English is a fallacy since bilingual jurors
can be struck from jury service merely on the basis of their bilingual
ability.190
Too quickly the courts and society discount LEP citizens’ ability to
serve with the assistance of interpreters. Centuries of historical practice of
juror language accommodation as well as the experience of New Mexico state
courts are ignored.191 Refusal to provide language accommodation to LEP
jurors may violate Title VI in jurisdictions with significant numbers of LEP
persons. Title VI should be employed to remedy this inequality and to reveal
the discriminatory nature behind seemingly race-neutral English- language
requirements.
2. Language Discrimination in Education
As the United States Supreme Court decision in Lau v. Nichols
demonstrated, language discrimination in public schools can violate the
national origin and race provisions of Title VI.192 Any school, public or
private, that receives federal funds falls under the purview of Title VI.193
There is a long history of language discrimination in schools in the United
States.194 Some states banned the teaching of foreign languages, and teachers
who taught in foreign languages faced possible prosecution. 195 However,
these linguistic hostilities against German and Japanese were short lived.196
The targeting of both the Spanish language and Latino Spanish-speakers has
persisted over the years and experienced a revival in the past several decades
as hostility against Latino immigrants has heightened.197
There is a long history of public schools in the Southwest imposing
“No-Spanish” rules on Latino students.198 Such rules were particularly
prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s, increasing when Mexican American
190
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children were allowed to integrate into previously racially segregated
schools.199 Punishment for violating English-only school rules has varied in
severity from humiliation, “Spanish detention,” or corporal punishment, to
suspension or expulsion.200 Punishment for speaking Spanish was often
designed to humiliate and imply that the Spanish language and those who
speak it lack intelligence.201 Labor leader César Chávez long remembered
and recounted instances where, in elementary school, he was placed with a
dunce cap and a sign that said, “I am a clown, I speak Spanish.”202 Children
were sometimes asked to write, “I will not speak Spanish on school grounds”
hundreds of times on the blackboard,203 or were simply beaten for speaking
a “dirty language.”204 The embarrassment of this punishment was
undoubtedly amplified when a student had to explain to her parents that she
had been disciplined for speaking their home language.205
No-Spanish rules are highly damaging to Latino children and their
ability to learn. In the late 1960s, the United States Commission on Civil
Rights conducted the “Mexican American Education Study” to research the
crisis of deficient Latino educational attainment.206 The Commission found
that many school districts enforced No-Spanish rules and these policies were
detrimental to the students’ personal and academic development. 207 NoSpanish rules inflict psychological harm and diminish Latino children’s selfesteem, which in turn lessens learning outcomes.208 In response to NoSpanish school rules, many Latino families felt pressured to make sure their
199
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children only spoke English.209 This resulted in a loss of Spanish as a heritage
language for many families, leading to a loss of identity, self-esteem, and
ability to communicate with one’s familial elders.210 Due to the harmful
impact of these policies, No-Spanish rules have been highly criticized and
deemed an unfortunate racist relic of the past.211
However, despite widespread renouncement of the practice, NoSpanish public school rules have reemerged in the past two decades.212 Even
when the rules are termed “English-only” rather than specifying Spanish,
these language rules have focused on Spanish-speaking Latinos and are for
all practical purposes No-Spanish rules.213
The following three examples illustrate how English-only rules in
schools are not race-neutral but are actually racially discriminatory and
should be found to violate Title VI. These examples also demonstrate the
need for Department of Education regulations addressing English-only
school policies.
In 2005, Zach Rubio, a bilingual Latino 16-year-old in Kansas City,
Kansas, was on a break at school when a schoolmate passing in the hall asked
to borrow a dollar in Spanish.214 Zach responded simply, “No problema.”215
A teacher overheard the conversation and sent Zach to the principal’s office,
where the principal ordered him to call his father and leave the school.216 The
principal told Zach, “If you want to speak Spanish, go back to Mexico.”217
Zach was suspended from school for speaking Spanish.218
More recently, in November 2013,219 Amy Lacey, the principal at
Hempstead Middle School in Hempstead, Texas, made an announcement
over the intercom forbidding the entire school from speaking Spanish.220
209
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Subsequently, teachers began to threaten students with punishment for
speaking Spanish.221 The effect on the Latino children was considerable.
Some students felt that the principal’s directive gave teachers and other
students permission to discriminate against and harass them.222 Children
became afraid to speak their native tongue and risk getting disciplined.223 One
eighth grade student, Yedhany Gallegos, tried to explain to the principal that
Spanish was her first language, and the principal responded by encouraging
her to leave the school.224
More than half of the students in the Hempstead district are Latino
and many speak Spanish.225 As a result of these attacks on students’ language,
the principal was suspended.226 Her suspension may have triggered a
campaign to intimidate Latinos in the community.227 After taking disciplinary
action against Ms. Lacey, the district’s superintendent, who is Latina,
reported that strangers have watched and taken photos of her house; her yard
was vandalized; and her garbage was searched.228 Vandals also damaged the
brakes of three Hempstead school busses.229 These actions are a sign of the
racial tensions related to the use of Spanish in this community.
No-Spanish rules have also been extended by public schools to
regulate communication off school grounds. In 2007, the Esmeralda County
School District in Nevada made a rule prohibiting students from speaking
Spanish on a school bus that transported Latino students who lived in the
small farming and ranching community of Esmeralda to Tonopah High
School in neighboring Nye County.230 The bus ride took approximately an
hour and a half each way.231 There were other buses that transported students
between Esmeralda County and Nye County, but students were free to speak
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any language of their choice on those routes.232
These stories show how English-only school rules are often not raceneutral and, instead, discriminate on both the basis of national origin and race.
In the Rubio case, Zach was suspended for uttering “no problema” instead of
“no problem.” He was suspended on the basis of the Spanish vowel “a.”
Interestingly, the phrase “no problema” is not actually Spanish. Rather it is
slang combining the English “no problem” and the Spanish “no hay
problema.”233 This “Spanglish” phrase, as well as its even less grammatically
correct, “no problemo,” are commonly used by white Americans, often with
anti-Hispanic sentiment.234 However, it is unheard of, and difficult to
imagine, that a non-Latino would be suspended or otherwise disciplined for
saying “No problema.” The racial and national origin animus against Latinos
is obvious since Spanish was the only language targeted at that school.
Further, the principal told Zach, “If you want to speak Spanish, go back to
Mexico.” This is a racist statement, one that is common toward Latinos. Zach
is an American citizen by birth; he cannot go “back” to Mexico. He is not
from Mexico. He is from the United States. This statement was a racial attack.
In Hempstead Middle School, the principal focused only on the Spanish
language, going so far as to yell over the intercom that Spanish is not
permitted on school grounds. On the school buses in Esmeralda County, only
the bus traveling to a farming community with a significant population of
Latinos was subject to the language ban. These three different English-only
school rules were clearly No-Spanish rules aimed at targeting Latino
children.
These instances indicate that No-Spanish rules in public schools are
not merely a historic relic. Along with constitutional First Amendment
claims,235 Title VI could be a vehicle to address such rules. Two types of Title
VI violations are presented by English-only school rules: different treatment
and hostile educational environment.236 Different treatment claims arise
when a student is subject to an adverse educational action or otherwise
232
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deprived of the ability to participate in or benefit from the educational
program or activity provided by the school.237 This can occur, for example,
when a Latino student is suspended from school for speaking Spanish. In such
a case, to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VI, the
plaintiff must show that she is a member of a protected class; suffered an
adverse action or deprivation; and that this adverse action or deprivation was
taken because of race or national origin.238
The second type of potential Title VI action concerns hostile learning
environment.239 This applies when the actions taken by the school
individually might not constitute a sufficient deprivation of participation or
benefit but collectively the language-based national origin or racial
harassment interferes with the student’s ability to participate in or benefit
from the educational program or activities provided by the school. 240 To
prove a prima facie suit of hostile educational environment under Title VI,
the plaintiff must show that she is part of a protected class; the harassment
was implemented because of her race or national origin; the school actually
knew or was deliberately indifferent to the harassment; and the harassment
was so severe, pervasive, and offensive that the harassment denied plaintiff
access to the educational benefits or opportunities provided by the school.241
The detrimental effect of No-Spanish rules on Latino students has
long been recognized.242 Not only are Latino students directly deprived of
educational opportunities by having their education interrupted with
discipline for speaking Spanish, English-only rules denigrate the culture and
identity of Latino youth, instilling a sense of inferiority and fear. 243 Selfesteem, including cultural pride, and feelings of safety are vital for a child’s
academic success.244 English-only school rules also encourage other
expressions of race and national origin discrimination by administrators,
teachers, and peers.245 The ban on Spanish is not only a direct attack on a
237
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central trait of the student’s identity, but it also becomes a proxy and pretext
for expressing racial prejudice against Latinos. Hurtful comments, such as
“Go back to Mexico”246 or telling a child she cannot touch a United States
flag because they are not in Mexico,247 are thrust upon American students of
Latino descent in English-only schools. As in the 1950s and 1960s, Spanish
today is still considered a “dirty” and lowly language by some school
administrations. This is suggested by how some schools have equated any
Spanish use with bullying.248 A primary reason school administrators give for
banning Spanish is a worry that foul, disrespectful, disruptive words will be
used, even when there has been no factual basis for this concern.249
Currently, there are no federal regulations or guidelines directing
schools’ usage of English-only rules. The best practice would be to encourage
a multicultural, multilingual environment that values diversity and prepares
students for the realities of a multicultural and multilingual world where
bilingualism and cross-cultural competence are valuable and profitable skills.
However, as pedagogical determinations are usually made at the state and
local level,250 at a minimum, the United States Department of Education
should offer guidelines advising schools how to avoid Title VI violations. As
a starting place, the guidelines could be modeled after the EEOC’s Title VII
“Speak-English-only rules.”251
As patterned after the EEOC’s Title VII national origin compliance
“Speak-English-only rules,” English-only policies could only be established
for a non-discriminatory purpose. Across the board bans on languages other
than English (such as those that require only English to be spoken at all times
on school premises) should be presumptively considered to violate Title VI.
English-only rules should only be permissible if justified by educational
necessity. Thus, it would be permissible to require that written or oral
assignments be communicated in English, but a casual conversation between
students during break time could not be subject to English-language
restrictions. In evaluating whether to adopt an English-only rule, a school
246
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district should weigh the educational justifications for the rule against
possible discriminatory effects. Given the extensive racial history of language
discrimination in schools, English-only policies in schools should be
scrutinized closely to ensure that they do not advance discrimination or
otherwise decrease the educational success of Latinos and other minority
children.
III. STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS WITH THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT: LIMITED
SUCCESS IN REDRESSING LANGUAGE DISCRIMINATION
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was drafted primarily to address blatant
racism against African Americans, but it has been interpreted more liberally
to tackle race and national origin discrimination against diverse groups.252
One of the Act’s significant steps toward racial equity has been its recognition
that language discrimination can be a form of national origin or race
discrimination. These language discrimination protections have outpaced
legal protections under the United States Constitution, which has been slow
to recognize the reality that language discrimination is often a method of or
pretext for race, ethnic, or national origin discrimination. However, the Act
has been ineffectual in redressing language inequity for at least three reasons.
First, the federal government has established regulations concerning
language discrimination, but some states have been reluctant to follow these
regulations.253 Second, language protection under the Act has been
inconsistent and incomplete254 due to a variety of factors, including resistance
to recognizing the relationship between race and language. 255 Finally,
pursuant to the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the Act has been utilized
as an excuse not to reach constitutional rulings that could establish broader
language-based protection for minorities.256
A. State Resistance to Federal Regulations
States have been reluctant to follow federal law and mandates with
respect to language equality, as exemplified by their resistance to ensuring
meaningful access to the courts for LEP persons. Title VI applies to state
courts that receive federal financial assistance and, therefore, as discussed
above, such courts are required to abide by Executive Order 13166 and the
252
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DOJ’s LEP Guidance by ensuring that their programs are available to LEP
individuals.257 Specifically, these state courts must provide interpretive
services during all hearings, trials, and motions in which LEP individuals are
present.258 Courts cannot charge LEP individuals for interpretive services and
must ensure that the provided interpreters are competent.259
Despite Title VI, Executive Order 13166, and the DOJ LEP
regulations, LEP individuals continue to have limited access to and
participation in the court system.260 Without an interpreter, LEP litigants are
too often unable to fully understand court proceedings, making it impossible
for them to “obtain restraining orders to protect them from domestic violence,
argue for custody of their children, successfully fight against their family’s
eviction, or compel employers to pay wages owed to them.”261 Further, LEP
criminal defendants may not understand their own trials without an adequate
interpreter.262 Despite the serious consequences for LEP litigants who are
forced to proceed without sufficient language interpretation, LEP litigants
continue to face significant barriers when it comes to accessing the
courtroom.263 According to a recent study, approximately 46 percent of the
states surveyed did not require that interpreters be provided in all civil cases;
80 percent fail to guarantee that the court will pay for interpreters; and 37
percent of the states that do provide interpreters fail to require the use of
certified court interpreters.264 Executive Order 13166 and the DOJ LEP
regulations have made it clear that beneficiaries and participants of federally
funded court programs and activities are entitled to interpretive services and
that failure to provide such interpretation may constitute a violation of Title
VI.265 However, this statute and its regulations have not been sufficiently
257
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enforced.266 Title VI-compliant interpretation programs should be more
actively enforced to ensure equal access to court facilities for all persons,
irrespective of English-language ability.
State resistance to Title VI mandates which require that LEP people
be provided interpretation and adequate access to the courts is striking
because the Act was drafted as a direct response to state refusal to follow
federal antidiscrimination law. In the 1950s and 1960s, despite the landmark
decision in Brown v. Board of Education,267 the hope of desegregation was
“dulled by resistance [from Southern states] to any but minimal steps toward
compliance.”268 The failure of states to desegregate their schools and public
accommodations led to various sit-ins and protests throughout the South.269
Unfortunately, several whites did not heed the message of nonviolence. As
images of “white violence inflicted upon nonviolent black protestors”
permeated every media outlet, Congress was pressured to respond by passing
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.270 Congress’s
intention is manifest in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Records of floor debates in the Senate reflect that “the overriding purpose of
the legislation was to alleviate the manifest problems of society-wide
discrimination against African Americans” that occurred despite federal law
and orders to the contrary.271
The failure of state courts to follow federal antidiscrimination law and
regulations concerning LEP language access is an indicator that there has
been less progress in the past fifty years in the realm of civil rights than many
might believe or hope. Recent events targeting Latinos in the Southwest are
eerily reminiscent of race discrimination in the South in the 1960s.272 The
266

Id.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
268
DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 4 (2004).
269
JUAN PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE
AMERICA 161–64 (2000).
270
Id. at 164.
271
Ethnicity and Prejudice, supra note 42, at 821.
272
Lisa Gray, Principal Who Told Kids Not to Speak Spanish Will Lose Job,
HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.chron.com/news /education/
article/Principal-who-told-kids-not-to-speak-Spanish-will-5327528.php
(discussing how, at a majority-Latino middle school in Hempstead, Texas,
Principal Amy Lacey ordered students to not speak Spanish; Lacey was suspended
for her discriminatory behavior and it is suspected that her “suspension may have
set off a campaign to intimidate Hispanics,” including harassment of the district’s
Latina superintendent and the severing of brake lines of school buses). “A lot of
this sounds like Mississippi in the 1950s and ‘60s,” commented Augustin Pinedo,
267

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2627306

LANGUAGE RIGHTS UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

41

Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its regulations can only be effective if they are
enforced.
B. Inconsistent & Incomplete Language Protection under the Act
As outlined above, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been used to
address language discrimination. However the treatment of such
discrimination under the Act is inconsistent and incomplete. On one hand,
the Act has been more forward thinking than other segments of law, such as
constitutional jurisprudence, in recognizing the reality that native language is
often a central constituent of national origin, and that discrimination on the
basis of language can amount to national origin discrimination and possibly
race discrimination.
The United States Supreme Court has not directly determined whether
discrimination on the basis of language can constitute discrimination on the
basis of national origin, race, or ethnicity under Equal Protection.273 In
Hernandez v. New York, a plurality opinion and the Court’s most recent
language discrimination case, the justices indicated a variety of views about
the possible connection between language and race.274 In a concurring
opinion by Justice O’Connor joined by Justice Scalia, Justice O’Connor
stated that “[n]o matter how closely tied or significantly correlated to race the
explanation for a peremptory strike may be, the strike does not implicate the
Equal Protection Clause unless it is based on race.”275 Justice Kennedy
indicated the opposite view that “[i]t may well be, for certain ethnic groups
and in some communities, that proficiency in a particular language, like skin
color, should be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection
analysis.”276 Currently, language restrictions and requirements are commonly
subject to rational basis review, rather than the heightened scrutiny afforded
restrictions based on race, ethnicity, and national origin. 277 Further, unlike
causes of action under Title VI and Title VII, 278 disparate impact claims are
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not recognized under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.279 As such, language discrimination claims are generally more
difficult to assert under the Constitution than under the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Therefore, the Act can be celebrated as a progressive advancement for
language equity and, ultimately, racial justice.
On the other hand, the lack of explicit mention of language in the text
of the statute or its legislative history has made language protections under
the Act uncertain and subject to attack, criticism, and inconsistent
treatment.280 Language, as it relates to national origin, was only mentioned
briefly in the Title VII bona fide occupation qualification exception
context.281 It does not appear that Congress gave much consideration to either
the substance or scope of the term “national origin,” much less to language,
as the majority of legislative discussion of the Act focused on racial
discrimination against African Americans.282 It is not surprising that
discussions of the meaning of national origin under the Civil Rights Act were
“quite meager” since African Americans were overwhelmingly born in the
United States, were native English speakers, and thus did not experience
discrimination on the basis of national origin or language.283
With this backdrop, it is no surprise that antidiscrimination law is illequipped to deal with racial discrimination against Latinos. This is not to
imply in any way that existing law sufficiently addresses racial discrimination
against African Americans. Rather, it is an observation that the static
development and interpretation of civil rights law under a black-white binary
paradigm of race often leaves Latinos without sufficient legal recourse to
address discrimination. Under the black-white paradigm, non-black minority
groups can only seek legal redress to the extent to which they can successfully
analogize their experience to that of African Americans.284
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Manifestations of racism against Latinos share some similarities with
racism against African Americans, but there are two primary differences:
language discrimination and perceived foreignness. Like African Americans,
Latinos often experience racism based on skin color or phenotype, and they
are the subject of derogatory racialized slurs. But unlike most discrimination
against African Americans, discrimination against Latinos is expressed
frequently in terms of language. Another principal expression of racism
against Latinos is perceived foreignness; the assumption that, based on their
race, minority persons are not “American” irrespective of how many
generations of their families have lived in the United States or even whether
they are indigenous to the land that is now part of the United States.285 In the
case of Latinos, the majority are native-born United States citizens.286 In fact,
many Chicanos never crossed the border, but rather the border crossed them
as the result of the Mexican-American war in which the United States gained
a third of its current land mass.287
By recognizing language discrimination primarily under the national
origin provisions of the Act rather than its race provisions, the Act
perpetuates this perceived-foreignness problem. It ignores the fact that many
targets of language discrimination are native born, multigenerational, and
even indigenous Americans. In doing so, the Act seems to signal that
language discrimination is an immigrant problem or a problem that relates to
one’s foreign ancestry. It ignores the reality that, for many Latinos, language
discrimination is race discrimination,288 thereby overlooking one of the
principal ways in which Latinos experience racism.
C. Constitutional Avoidance
Under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, courts have used the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a reason not to reach rulings that would establish
constitutional protection for language minorities.289 Although this is not a
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fault of the Civil Rights Act itself, it is a way the statute interacts with
constitutional judicial decision-making that reduces the effectiveness of the
Act’s protection against language discrimination. The doctrine of
constitutional avoidance is a judicially created principle that a court should
not reach a constitutional ruling if the matter could be decided on statutory
grounds.290 This approach was applied in Lau v. Nichols.291 The United States
Supreme Court’s finding that the failure to provide LEP students of Chinese
descent ESL instruction amounted to a violation of Title VI on the basis of
national origin or race provided grounds for not reaching the plaintiffs’
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claims. Although a finding of a
constitutional violation would not have necessarily directly benefited the Lau
plaintiffs more than the Title VI ruling, it likely would have significantly
advanced the rights of language minorities because Title VI and the other
provisions of the Act are limited in their breadth of application and could be
repealed by the legislature.

CONCLUSION
Fifty years after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, this
groundbreaking statute still remains significant in the struggle for racial
justice. Despite some shortcomings and limitations, the Act has the potential
to effectuate improved language equity and, in turn, greater racial equality.
However, for this to be achieved we need to examine the racialized nature of
English-language requirements with close scrutiny. Language is too often left
out of the discussion of race and civil rights because it is deemed to be a
legitimate, race-neutral basis upon which to discriminate. As this Article has
argued, however, language is not race-neutral. It is race laden.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is often celebrated in retrospect. The
Act’s present glory might be how, in a colorblind era, its interpretation has
taken a relatively realistic analysis of language discrimination by recognizing
that English-language requirements can amount to national origin
discrimination. This clear-sighted view of the reality of language
COURT SIDESTEPS HARD CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
(2001) (see specifically the chapter entitled, “The Court Avoids Scrutinizing
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290
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discrimination should be expanded upon within the Civil Rights Act and
adopted in other statutory and constitutional contexts to address modern day
racism. “Like a virus that has mutated, racism has evolved into different
forms that are more difficult not only to recognize but also to combat.”292
Language restrictions in workplaces, schools, places of public
accommodation, and courtrooms are contemporary symptoms of racism that
work subtly to exclude and oppress Latinos and other persons of color. Civil
rights laws need to be sufficiently adaptable to contend with ever-changing
manifestations and expressions of racial subordination. The Civil Rights Act
of 1964 has taken some small steps toward this end; perhaps if its gait were
to invigorate, society would have something to truly celebrate in another fifty
years.
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